Re-assembling knowledge production with(out) the university by Christopher, Muellerleile
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in:
Globalisation, Societies & Education
                                           
   
Cronfa URL for this paper:
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa49787
_____________________________________________________________
 
Paper:
Muellerleile, C. (in press).  Re-assembling Knowledge Production With(Out) The University. Globalisation, Societies &
Education
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence. Copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder.
 
Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/ 
 RE-ASSEMBLING KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION WITH(OUT) THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 
Introductory paper for the themed issue of Globalisation, Societies & Education 
 
Chris Muellerleile1 & Nick Lewis2 
 
March 2019 
 
 
Note: While the complete special issue is not yet published, the five substantive papers are 
available on the Globalisation, Societies & Education website: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cgse20/current 
 
 
Abstract 
As an introduction to the themed issue, this paper interrogates the idea of university unbundling 
through a critical reading of Ronald Coase’s theory of transaction costs. Coase, who was initially 
interested in the structure of firms, later applied his transaction cost theory more broadly to 
anything that might be defined as ‘welfare’. Not unlike other abstract economic theories, in the 
age of market discipline, Coase’s ideas have been widely employed to discipline the provision of 
public goods with market forces. Read through Coase, the main effect of the unbundling 
discourse has been to rationalize the university—to make it subject to a logic of efficiency as an 
end, and ultimately we suspect, to do damage to universities as important institutions for the 
cultivation of democratic values and socio-economic justice. After a brief summary of the other 
six papers included in the issue, the paper concludes with a discussion of the possibility of 
maintaining a public university in light of the neoliberal discourse of unbundling. 
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Introduction 
 
If you pay attention to the current socio-economic literature on universities and higher 
education, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that we are living through a crisis. As one of the 
popular stories goes, if universities do not adapt quickly, mostly by aligning with capital, they will 
be replaced by other institutions that can provide the same services, but at a lower price and 
higher quality. With decreasing public support, rising levels of tuition and student debt, and the 
rapid growth of both privatization and technocratic management structures in formerly public 
universities, it may in fact be appropriate to label this as a crisis. But this assertion should not be 
accepted uncritically. It is important to understand who is suggesting there is a crisis, and why.  
This special issue of Globalisation, Societies and Education was partly inspired by a 2013 report 
suggesting that a crisis was underway, or at least a ‘revolution’ was in store for universities across 
the globe. We are referring to the infamous “An Avalanche is Coming” report, co-authored by 
the current Chair of the UK’s Office for Students, and long-time senior advisor for Pearson 
PLC, Michael Barber. Barber, et al’s (2013) prescription for survival in the face of this inevitable 
revolution is to “unbundle” the various products and services currently packaged up in the 
university and expose each to market forces. Barber, et al. present unbundling as a simple, 
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uncontroversial, and common-sense solution in the face of crisis, which conveniently frames 
those who would stand in the way as old-fashioned and overly conservative. The report is 
analysed in depth by Lewis and Shore (2019) in their contribution to this issue, so we will not 
dwell on it here (see also McCowen 2017, Robertson & Komljenovic 2016). That said, one of 
our main goals in editing this collection is to resist the assumption that unbundling is a coherent 
set of ideas, and furthermore that it is inevitable. We also want to resist the idea that universities 
are habitually intransigent in the face of ‘progress’. These effort begins by digging deeper into the 
socio-economic assumptions that lie behind proposals like Barber et al’s. As such, by way of an 
introduction to this collection of papers, this essay explores and critiques the idea of 
(un)bundling in the context of the economic theory of transaction costs, including how that theory 
has been used in neoliberal efforts to privatize and marketize higher education.3 
Our initial observation in calling for these papers was that both technological change and 
entrepreneurial actors were not just unbundling universities, but in effect ‘re-assembling’ both 
universities as institutions as well as academic knowledge itself, something that Bacevic (2019) 
explicitly analyses in her contribution. Furthermore, we were interested in whether and how the 
call to unbundle relates to what some see as a neoliberal assault on universities. At the same time, 
our intention was to avoid the reductive impulse that suggests a neoliberal steamroller is 
arbitrarily destroying public universities across the UK and U.S. Rather we wanted to examine 
specific cases of transformation in the university sector in an effort to shed new light on 
processes like privatization, financialization, and digitization, which are often clumsily grouped as 
neoliberal. We took a cue from Geoff Mann’s book, Dissassembly Required (2013), an attempt to 
demystify “actually existing” capitalist processes in the wake of the sub-prime financial crisis by 
focusing on the intersection of material processes in the economy with dominant economic ideas 
driving and shoring up those process. In the same way, this collection investigates the messy 
realities where concrete processes of university restructuring intersect with ideas put forth to 
enable, justify and criticise those processes. 
Put differently, the impetus for the original call for papers was a desire to explore the middle 
ground where two contradictory truths meet, splinter and take imperfect and contingent form. 
First is the capitalist bulldozer, maybe best exemplified by moves to unbundle, dismantle, and 
privatize public universities, or to paraphrase Newfield (2019) the “quiet intimidation of the 
spectre” of a marketized destiny. And second, widespread efforts across the globe to improve 
access, integrate useful technologies, and otherwise ‘re-assemble’ higher education and academic 
knowledge even if it no longer involves what many of us imagine to be ‘the university’. We hope 
this special issue makes a small advance in knowledge in that direction. 
Before diving into the substance, however, it is appropriate to offer a bit of background. 
Each of the papers collected in this special issue relate to a recently concluded project called 
Universities in the Knowledge Economy (UNIKE)4, which ran from 2012-2016. It was an EU 
funded Marie Curie Initial Training Network (ITN), coordinated by Professor Susan Wright of 
Aarhus University in Denmark, and included senior professors and research fellows at five other 
European universities.5 As part of the ITN scheme, the entire project was organised around the 
training and research of 12 Ph.D., and 3 post-doctoral fellows, all of whom conducted original 
research on universities and/or the higher education sector. During the final conference for the 
project, themed “University Futures” in June of 2016, a group of us organized two sessions on 
assemblages and disassemblages of knowledge production in relation to the contemporary 
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university. Six of the seven papers collected here were part of that session, including this one. As 
the handling editors we are biased, but it is an extraordinary set of papers, and we hope you will 
find the time to read them. 
 
Transacting competition 
 
The logic behind bundling or unbundling a group of activities has several antecedents, but 
we are mainly interested in Ronald Coase’s theory of transaction costs, which he first devised as 
a way to explain the “nature of the firm” in 1937, and for which he won a Nobel Prize in 1991. 
In the context of what most economists believed was a highly efficient system of production 
coordinated by markets or ‘price mechanisms’, he was interested in the relationship between the 
market and the firm. The basic problem for Coase was to explain why firms choose to expose 
some exchanges to market forces (e.g. purchasing goods from a supplier) and not others (e.g. 
managing activities across multiple corporate divisions). His answer began by suggesting that 
both market transactions and internal firm relationships were subject to the same basic 
rationality, that of cost reduction. He proposed to frame all relations linked to production as 
“transactions”, each of which entailed costs related to things like communication and 
coordination. For Coase, even market transactions were costly, an assumption that few 
economists had considered in any detail. Complex relationships that required sustained 
coordination or planning, particularly in the face of uncertainty, were less costly to ‘manage’ 
inside of a firm, rather than bidding them out to the market. He explained this by saying “the 
distinguishing mark of the firm is supersession of the price mechanism” (p. 389). On one hand, 
if firms were efficient because they insulated their activities from the market, Coase wondered 
why all economic production was not internalized in one giant firm, perhaps not unlike a 
socialist state. On the other hand, if markets are highly efficient at distributing goods and 
services to those who most needed them, and entrepreneurs constantly seek to meet market 
demand, why is production not “distributed amongst millions of tiny firms” (Walker 1988: 382). 
In other words, why are large firms necessary at all? Reality is somewhere in between these 
extremes, and Coase and his followers, most notably Oliver Williamson, wanted to understand 
why (Carroll & Teece 1999).  
In Coase’s transaction cost theory, firm structures are not determined by institutional history, 
local path-dependency, or cultural embeddedness, but rather the vertical integration or ‘make or 
buy’ problem. Analytically, for any component of the production process, the question is simple. 
Considering all possible costs, is it less expensive to produce something, or to go out to the 
market and buy it? Whether considering the centralization of management bureaucracies at the 
end of the 19th Century, the growth of diversified conglomerates in the 1950s and 60s, hostile 
takeovers and asset stripping in the 1980s, or even today’s digital platform monopolies, the 
historical evolution of the corporate form in the U.S. could be explained with this theory. In 
each case, the calculation of the costs of internalization versus those of externalization drive 
corporate structures. As such, the corporation becomes little more than a shell inside of which a 
hierarchy of individuals enter into free, if not highly complex, contracts (see Birch 2016 for an 
overview). Outside of that shell, the corporate hierarchy fades to irrelevance as designated actors 
negotiate transactions on behalf of the corporation with other firms and actors on ‘the market’. 
This said, the importance of Coase’s theory goes beyond firm structures. The broader 
significance of this theory came in cleaving neo-classical market theory from actual market 
exchange. The cleavage was to have two fundamental implications for the trajectory of 
economics as a performative body of ideas. First, Coase’s argument was that neo-classical pricing 
theory was actually in operation, even when there was no explicit or imminent market exchange 
(Davies 2014). Put differently, the implication of the theory was that even ‘inside’ of a firm, 
competitive and calculative market-like rationality was operating anytime a contract was 
established to ‘bundle’ parts of the production process. The implication of this is that the 
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institutional coherence or integrity of a firm, or a market for that matter, are less important than 
the costs of the contractual arrangements that hold these institutions together. And, second, as 
those who followed him came to practice economics as a discipline, or perform it as a discursive 
governance formation, the argument obviated the need to investigate and theorise how firms, 
markets or economies actually operated on the ground. After all why would you need to study 
actual businesses and markets if all transactions take place on the head of a rationally maximising 
transactional pin? 
In 1960 Coase, by then a member of the neoliberal Mont Pelerin Society, expanded the 
application of his transaction cost theory, this time applying it to the economy in general. By 
1960 neoliberal economic thought had begun a new phase. At least amongst the Chicago School 
neoliberals, the ordo-liberal foundations that provided moral and technical limits to market order 
were giving way to a second wave of more radical ideas (Davies 2014), and with this Coase fit 
hand in glove.  
In “The Problem of Social Costs” (1960), Coase argues that every institutional arrangement, 
including the negotiation and application of contracts, can be understood according to a question 
of transaction costs. Even the rearrangement of property rights, a sacred cow amongst many 
neoliberals, was little more than a question of costs. The important question for Coase in 
analysing the optimality of any commodity, contract, or institutional arrangement was not a 
question of history, morality, or justice, or even whether the state or a price mechanism was 
ordering society. Rather, the proper question was which arrangement will result in the greatest 
aggregate benefit for society, or what he called “social welfare”.  
Coase’s paper is famous, or infamous, as an impulse for the development of the Chicago 
“law and economics” school. Where in ordo-liberal thought, economics was ultimately subject to 
the moral-juridical logic of the law, the Coase theorem suggested that the law should ultimately 
be subject to economic rationality (Davies 2014). As Davies argues, where in post-War ordo-
liberalism “legalism” was “prior to economism” (77), in second wave neoliberalism, economism 
became the foundation for law, justice, and morality. This has a number of important 
implications, to which we will return below, but at their heart is a redefinition of welfare or 
wellbeing, not to mention statecraft, both of which became technocratic problems, first and 
foremost concerned with ‘efficiency’, and that could only be solved through techno-economic 
means. 
 Maybe the best-known example of the application of the Coase theorem is the 
“problem” of monopolies. Prior to the 1950s, most ordo/neoliberal thinkers argued for state 
intervention to break up corporate monopolies because they pre-empted the possibility of fair 
and just competition in the market. The implication of Coase’s argument for corporate 
monopolies was twofold. First, the “corporation”, monopoly or otherwise, could be reimagined 
as a set of competitive, private contracts, constantly subject to renegotiation including across the 
boundary of the corporate entity. In other words, monopoly corporations were ephemeral, so 
the best solution might simply be to wait for their destruction by entrepreneurs who would 
inevitably find ways to compete. Second, in the aggregate it was possible that monopolies could 
produce goods or services at a lower aggregate cost to the economy given that the cost of 
breaking them up and rearranging their property rights could be very expensive (see 
Christophers 2016: 227-240). This said, in the sphere of public goods, the Coase theorem fuelled 
arguments for breaking up inefficient and non-competitive state monopolies. The bottom line 
for post-Coase neoliberalism is that regardless of the power they wield, from the narrow 
perspective of transaction costs, monopolies are more or less irrelevant. The important question 
is whether any productive institution is cost efficient in the provision of “social welfare”, 
whether that welfare takes the form of guns, butter, or higher education. 
Similarly, Coase along with a handful of other Chicago School economists, “cut through the 
confusion” surrounding public goods (Mirowski 2011: 61) by simply denying that they existed in 
any coherent form. For post-Coase Chicago neoliberals, questions of rivalry, excludability, and 
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externality, the properties typically employed to assess whether a good ought to be considered 
public or private, were less relevant than what they saw in the abstract as a clearer assessment 
technique: identifying the costs necessary to exchange the goods in question and/or rearrange 
contracts, property rights, and institutional structures to facilitate more efficient exchange. In the 
case that transaction costs could not be measured, one of the first moves would be to construct 
an economic model to make estimates. Not surprisingly, disaggregation, or unbundling of a 
group of property rights (e.g. a corporation or a complex commodity) at least in the terms of 
accounting is a necessary step in identifying and measuring costs (Mirowski 2011: 41-83). The 
question in relation to transaction costs is not about values or purpose, nor is it concerned with a 
distinction between public and private, or society and economy. Rather it is exclusively interested 
in efficiency.  
 
Efficiency at all costs 
 
So what does this all have to do with contemporary university restructuring? The answer lies 
in the failings of the Coase theorem. We are far from the first to observe that the Coase theorem 
is flawed (cf. Davies 2014). Along with several of the papers collected here, we want to argue 
against this type of reductive and economistic thinking. But of course this does not mean that 
the logic of a transaction cost approach, translated into arguments for unbundling are irrelevant. 
These are powerful ideas in their reduction, abstraction from reality, and simplistic elegance. And 
given their highly abstract nature, there are several not unexpected problems when they are 
applied to universities.  
That said, with the exception of these initial comments, we are going to avoid a full scale 
criticism of neoliberalism, which can be found elsewhere (cf. Mirowski 2011, Davies 2014). In 
fact, as Davies (2014) demonstrates, a close interrogation of Coase’s theory sheds new light on 
the broad implications of neoliberal governance. In the unavoidable absence of a laissez faire 
utopia, or “market society” as Polanyi (2001) called it, individual citizens, states, and civil society 
have to make judgements about where to expend public resources. Even Coase (1960) clearly 
understood this reality. But after 40 years of neoliberal dominance, at a time when the welfare 
state, government regulation and even juridical systems are subject to the logic of optimal 
economic outcomes, there is a diminishing set of external criteria by which to make ‘public’ 
decisions. There is a risk, as Couch (2019) describes in the case of the neoliberal reconstruction 
of higher education in Afghanistan, of a wholesale shift in the purpose of the university from 
social to economic outcomes, and to the production of private rather than public goods.  
As a range of social theorists and philosophers have pointed out, efficiency, or the reduction of 
costs with the same outcomes, is hardly an end in itself (Muellerleile & Robertson 2018). Among 
other things, the gradual expulsion of social, ethical and political criteria to judge the success of a 
university has created the space for competitive metrics and other quantitative benchmarks that 
increasingly judge winners and losers in the higher education game. For Davies (2014), Coase’s 
ideas help explain the importance of technocratic governance by prices and other quasi-price 
mechanisms like metrics that are based on discreet quantitative measurements. The papers in this 
special issue extend this observation to emphasise two ways in which these ideas are woven into 
the changes afoot in universities: predetermination and performative effect.   
Coase has effectively ensured that there is no justification for not unbundling a university 
other than those related to economic efficiency. Lewis and Shore (2019: pg. 3) are accurate when 
they say “public universities are not corporations”, but in a framework where every kind of 
institution producing any sort of socio-economic good, including the state, is judged according 
to the logic of transaction costs between rational, cost averse individuals, the distinction between 
corporations and universities is rendered largely irrelevant. At face value, the question that 
animates Barber, et al. is less whether education is a public or private good, and more whether 
breaking university ‘monopolies’ up into smaller pieces will result in greater “social welfare” in 
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the aggregate. In this context, the structure of a university becomes a series of ‘make or buy’ 
problems. For instance, why employ permanent academic staff when temporary contracts offer 
more flexibility? In other words, why ‘internalize’ the contractual relationship with academic 
staff, when the costs are seemingly lower to externalize the relationship to the labour market? 
Thinking like this transforms political, long-term, and ethical questions into short-term 
economic, or just technocratic questions. They become questions to be answered by accountants 
and administrators rather than political actors, university leaders or professional academics who 
might appeal to the democratic purpose of the university as a social institution, a good that is 
weakly-defined, valued outside of market relations, and a source of, and rationale for, a raft of 
‘transaction costs’. As Bajenova (2019) demonstrates in this issue, private think tanks often with 
explicit policy goals are seemingly more efficient at delivering knowledge, at least in neo-classical 
economic terms where the qualities and values of knowledge are understood to be established 
and monetised at the point of transaction between buyer and seller. If the relationship between 
academic or scientific knowledge and policy is strictly transactional, little more than the clinical 
production and conveyance of knowledge from one party to another, then this makes complete 
sense. Why not employ a think tank, which is unburdened by costs and concerns like students 
and pedagogy, academic tenure, research ethics, or public accountability? It is far from 
coincidental, for instance, that the Barber et al. report, was published by a think tank, The 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
In short then, if the starting assumption is that the university is little more than an expensive 
bundle of private contracts between teachers, researchers, administrators, and students, loosely 
organized around a misguided mission related to a fuzzy concept like democracy, the solution of 
unbundling is predetermined. More to the point, as Lewis and Shore demonstrate, the grip 
exercised by Coase and others over our governmental imaginations, means that there is little 
need to demonstrate that unbundled universities are more efficient if the beginning assumption 
is that bundled universities are already inefficient in the terms of economic transactions. There is 
geographic variability in the processes of unbundling. It has clearly taken root in the U.K. and 
the rest of the English speaking world, but makes much less sense in a place like Germany where 
the social and public benefits of universities are more deeply engrained. That said, as they 
continue to advance a narrow economistic version of efficiency, global networks of neoliberal 
policy makers both transgress and take advantage of nation-state borders, so it would be naïve to 
imagine that this is only an ‘Anglo’ question. 
Second, the suite of data, digital technologies and their application, and the expansionary 
logics embedded in the business of developing them and the expertise built around them, have 
created their own impetus for unbundling. In Bacevic’s terms, they have altered the ‘coding’ that 
lends internal coherence to university assemblages, and thus they contribute to the de- and re-
territorialization of those assemblages. If digital technologies have proven effective at anything, it 
is the disaggregation of institutions, social relations, and even bodies into smaller, discernible 
units that can be measured, surveilled, and of course marketed. Komljenovic (2019) in this issue 
provides a thorough examination of how this is happening to students, their skills sets, and the 
broader labour market. Furthermore, both Komljenovic (2019) and Bacevic (2019) make the 
crucial point that digital technologies do not ‘just’ dis-assemble the university. They also re-
assemble it with a mix of new flows of data and digital firms. In Coasian terms, digital 
technologies demand reorganization of the contracts and property relations of the university to 
produce knowledge-related commodities in a more efficient manner. In the terms of those 
seeking to extract platform rents and/or profit from market making, these highly abstract, but 
seemingly precise metrics and technologies both facilitate unbundling and make it more 
attractive. 
Put another way, these ‘forces’ of predetermination and performativity are contributing 
directly to the production of a post-political world. However, they are neither disembodied nor 
disembedded, and the technocratic imagination is far from apolitical. The Barber et al. 
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document, the competition for influence between universities and think tanks in Brussels, and 
the adoption by universities themselves of digital technologies, metrics, and learning 
management systems, are all tightly bound up in capitalist political economy. Their architects are 
self-interested and their projects are political. Producing a technocratic university (or world) is a 
deeply political act that reallocates resources, opportunities and privilege, even before any 
consideration is made of the self-interests and calculated analytical flaws that provide the 
substance of ‘An avalanche is coming’. As Lewis and Shore insist, it is not enough to take Barber 
et al.’s appeal to ‘social welfare’ in the form of efficiency at face value. Rather, if we recognise the 
free market to be the fantasy that it is (Žižek 1999; Dean 2003; Clarke 2012; Brown 2015), then 
Coase appears as a fantasist in a drama where the purpose of the public university is very much 
the plot, in both political and economic terms. Each of the papers that follow address this 
concern, which Newfield nails home in his commentary with the urgency and forthrightness 
required to contest the remaking of the university as an agent of postpolitics.  
 
 
Overview of the papers 
 
 The papers collected here approach these problems from a variety of perspectives, from 
different parts of the world, from the empirical to theoretical, and from objective to normative. 
(Un)bundling and (dis)assembly are considered in every paper, although this is not the dominant 
theme of all six. 
Lewis and Shore meet unbundling head-on with an explicit engagement with what they 
see as a process of economisation or the ways that “organisations are disassembled, monetised, 
repurposed and recast as economic enterprises”. In a critical reading of a series of ideologically 
driven reports, they expose the disturbing analysis-free zone that constitutes the unbundling 
argument. In two of the cases, the reports’ authors have a for-profit interest in unbundling. In 
effect the reports are “advocating worlds that they and their clients are already bringing into 
being” (6). This helps explain why, as Lewis and Shore emphasise, these reports offer close to 
zero evidence of why unbundling is necessary and beneficial. Rather, the reports are an up-close 
look at what in effect is a naked attempt to prepare the ground for a new round of university 
privatization in New Zealand and the U.K. This is more than an argument against neoliberal 
governance. Lewis and Shore end their paper with a set of implications of what unbundling 
makes possible. That is, a(nother) round of marketization and financialization through the 
atomizing of academic units and services, and by laying the groundwork for “rebundling…led by 
financialised capital and new sets of financial instruments.” 
Komljenovic picks up the argument by providing a remarkably detailed look at the 
practice of labour ‘market making’ in the brave new world of employability mandates and data-
driven credentialing. Her subject is the platform firm LinkedIn, the wholly owned Microsoft 
subsidiary that intends to restructure how skills are acquired, categorized, measured, and 
allocated to capital. Not surprisingly, a big part of the strategy is to assess individual universities’ 
effectiveness in delivering skills through a process of what she calls “qualification altmetrics”. 
This is a process of disaggregating education and learning into new skill categories that LinkedIn 
can assess and measure, and maybe not surprisingly, teach through their recently acquired online 
training sub-platform, Lynda. Taking advantage of positive “network effects”, LinkedIn lures in 
universities and students alike employing a ‘freemium’ model. In an increasingly competitive 
‘market’ amongst universities for undergraduate students, and increasingly competitive labour 
markets for university graduates, Komljenovic shows how both “cannot afford not to be 
involved with the platform.” 
Couch offers perhaps the starkest example of re-assembly of universities and the higher 
education sector in war-torn Afghanistan. Higher education was in tatters following two decades 
of invasion, war, and concomitant institutional decline, and finally the U.S.-led invasion in 2001-
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2. In the face of this “violent disintegration” of the university system, Couch draws on Naomi 
Klein’s notion of “disaster capitalism” to show how a starkly economistic version of higher 
education dominated the re-assemblage of universities through the 2000s. Under the influence of 
global policy networks, when reconstruction efforts began in 2002 the Afghani state adopted 
neoliberal approach to the rebuilding program. ‘Outside’ influence was hardly something new for 
the Afghanis, but in the 2000s, the dominant understanding of the purpose of higher education 
was to fuel the economy with broader concerns related to social justice or national unity 
subordinated. With little to no regulation in the post-conflict policy arena, there was an explosion 
of private providers offering dubious quality education, but nevertheless filling the mandate to 
construct a ‘knowledge economy’ by endowing young Afghanis with human capital. While 
Afghanistan may be an acute example, Couch provides a cautionary tale of the risks involved 
with assuming that the only function of universities is to serve as a means for economic ends. 
In the context of the declining legitimacy of conventionally produced academic research, 
Bajenova analyses the growth of think thanks in the European Union. These institutions have 
grown in number and influence in symbiosis with the EU itself over the last fifty years, and as 
Bajanova demonstrates, are just as influential on day to day policy as universities and their 
researchers. How did this happen? For Bajenova, think tanks have made a concerted effort in the 
social field of academic knowledge production to build up various forms of soft capital including 
economic, cultural, social, and symbolic. Crucially, think tanks emulate scientific expertise, but 
without the bureaucratic fetters of university administration, or the long term commitments of 
basic research. Think tanks have worked hard to cultivate credibility, in particular by 
distinguishing themselves from lobbyists by emphasizing their technical expertise and 
independence. Transparency is the answer to the charge of bias—yes, they may tend to support 
particular political parties, but at least they are open about it, in contrast to academics and 
universities who hide behind false objectivity. While characterising the unbundling of universities 
is not Bajanova’s point, her research clearly demonstrates the reassemblage of the landscape of 
policy expertise at a time when elite academic influence on the state may be on the wane. Think 
tanks are responsive, nimble, and in situ with policy makers in a way that university researchers 
typically are not—and justifiably may not want to be. Nevertheless universities and academics 
ought to take seriously these potential competitors in the field of knowledge production. 
Bacevic provides the most theoretical engagement of the collection. The paper argues for 
a relational conception of the university and explains how assemblage theory can  produce a 
more radical rethinking of contemporary change in universities. Bacevic challenges the value of 
unbundling as an analytical framework, arguing that it relies on an essentialized university that 
was never there to begin with. She draws on theorists such as Deleuze & Guattari, Callon, 
Latour, Harman, and particularly DeLanda, and in doing so, cultivates a productive tension with 
the other papers in the collection. She argues that universities have always been entangled with 
“state, space, and territory in the context of global capitalism” and have thus always been 
impermanent institutions in a constant state of (re)assemblage with other social formations. As 
such, Bacevic argues that a “new political economy” of higher education must “shift attention to 
the relational nature of knowledge production”. Rather than focus attention on what has been 
(or is assumed to have been) unbundled, she calls on critics to reimagine the boundaries of the 
university, not least in recognising its capacities to enliven positive change.  
 Newfield wraps up the collection with a level-headed reflection where he both 
synthesizes the previous papers and offers a friendly corrective to the critical theme of the 
special issue. He reinforces the necessity of a nonessentialzing analytical approach to the 
university—considering thoughtfully that it never was never a purely autonomous institution. At 
the same time, he underlines the importance of criticism of the strong discourse of unbundling, 
not least because of the “institutional power” of its advocates. Newfield suggests that policy 
makers considering the intentional disaggregation of universities ought to be compelled to 
answer three straightforward questions related to the purported benefits of unbundling. We will 
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not repeat them here (see pg. XX). At the same time Newfield implores critics of university 
privatization and digitalization to take caution to not reinforce the inevitability of these efforts. 
Put differently, Newfield urges critics of unbundling to take contingency or uncertainty more 
seriously suggesting that future research in this area converts “apparent drivers into 
uncertainties” with the anticipated effect of “treating the higher education system as an open 
space of contestation” rather than one headed toward an inevitable closure. In short, Newfield 
offers up a view of the contemporary university as a site where Coasian predetermination and 
performativity might be resisted, and a counter-hegemonic production of knowledge might be 
cultivated.  
 
 
Conclusion: The Unbounded University? 
 
 In closing, we return to the overarching theme of these papers, which is relatively simple. 
A project of unbundling or disassembling the university, especially one driven from ‘above’, 
ought to be subject to ongoing criticism. And this criticism should begin by rejecting the 
assumption that higher education is a series of economic transactions that ought to be subject to 
a technocratic quest to eliminate inefficiencies. The papers collected here (esp. Bacevic) also 
demonstrate that there is little value in assuming the opposite—that universities have clear and 
established boundaries that are beyond reproach. This said, the concrete realities of 
contemporary unbundling can only be understood within the context of neoliberal capitalism 
where rationalization and economic efficiency are ends in themselves, and the social or political 
value of the university is subordinated.  
As Coase suggested, unbundling often requires the rearrangement of property rights, but 
where boundaries and property rights are not clear, as with public or collective goods, they must 
be established. Successful unbundling will require that these rights are negotiated and formalized. 
In other words, the unbundling of public universities will predictably include processes of 
bounding, which is, as Lewis and Shore point out, typically a precursor to privatization and 
marketization. The transaction cost theory is clear on this matter. Whether inside a firm or not, it 
assumes anything could be traded in a market given the right contractual rearrangements. In the 
UK university sector, there is nothing surprising here. The imagination of the eventual efficient 
distribution of scarce higher education resources, or what Christophers (2019) calls the “allusive 
market”, is explicit in government discourse, and looms over the future of all universities. At the 
same time, the ‘markets’ that are constantly invoked by neoliberal politicians and technocrats are 
highly elusive, for many of the reasons that Marginson (2013) has pointed out. That is, it is very 
likely impossible to construct proper neoliberal price mechanisms in higher education exactly 
because the various components of university life cannot be disaggregated without doing great 
violence to them, and thus obviating their usefulness.  
Even if true capitalist markets in higher education are impossible (ibid.), this seems to be 
only a slight obstacle to constant attempts to inject more competition into the university sector. 
But at what cost? What if, in other words, the mechanisms designed to generate efficiency are 
actually more expensive than the purported inefficiencies they are designed to alleviate? We 
suspect that if it was possible, a truly empirical Coasian analysis of neoliberal efforts to 
disassemble and reassemble universities would demonstrate that it is a highly inefficient and 
damaging process. This is after all one of the enduring lessons from Coase—that ‘free’ markets 
are not free, but in fact expensive to produce and maintain. Coincidentally, beyond the manifold 
complexities of an empirical study that test this hypothesis, one of the reasons it is unlikely to 
happen is that to a great extent neoliberal dogma deems social, political, and public benefits as 
illegitimate, and therefore not worth measuring. The implication might be a tautology, but it is 
still worth stating: if a project of restructuring universities began with a concern for social as 
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opposed to economic6 costs and ‘efficiencies’, or public as opposed to private benefits, it would 
likely produce quite different outcomes. 
Finally, the theory of transaction costs has at least two effects related to boundaries, both 
of which we believe are damaging to the public university. The first is that a fluid and boundless 
university that is open to integration with the public is disallowed because those relationships 
cannot be ‘properly’ registered as private, contractual, transactional relations. Second, at the same 
time, the remarkably broad application of the Coase theorum means that only ‘economic’ 
boundaries are legitimate. As such, in this way of thinking, there is no legitimate way to protect 
the public university from incursions from capitalist markets. Whether universities ought to hold 
monopolies on credentialing for instance, is up for debate. But if the starting assumption is that 
universities exist only to produce credentials, and university credentials are only private 
economic goods attained through a market like transaction, the debate has been finished before 
it begins. We believe any project of unbundling must be subject to this kind of critique, and the 
papers collected here take a small step in that direction. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We thank the European Union via the FP7 Marie Sklodowska Curie Actions scheme for funding 
the project from which these papers emerged. We also thank Janja Komljenovic for helpful 
suggestions on a previous draft, and with the usual caveats. 
 
 
References 
 
Bacevic, J. (2019): “With or without U? Assemblage theory and (de)territorialising the 
university”, Globalisation, Societies and Education, DOI: 
10.1080/14767724.2018.1498323 
 
Bajenova, T. (2019): “Rescaling expertise in EU policy-making: European think tanks and their 
reliance on symbolic, political and network capital”, Globalisation, Societies and Education, DOI: 
10.1080/14767724.2018.1540926 
 
Barber, M., Donnelly, K., and Rizvi, S. (2013) “An Avalanche is Coming. Higher Education and 
the Revolution Ahead”, London: Institute for Public Policy Research (March 2013). 
http://www.studynet2.herts.ac.uk/intranet/lti.nsf/0/684431DD8106AF1680257B560052BCCC
/$FILE/avalanche-is-coming_Mar2013_10432.pdf 
 
Birch, K. (2016) “Market vs. contract? The implications of contractual theories of corporate 
governance to the analysis of neoliberalism”, ephemera: theory & politics in organization, 16(1) 
 
Brown, W., 2015. Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism's stealth revolution. Mit Press.  
 
                                                 
6 Here we realise that we are depending on a flawed binary distinction between society and economy, 
which could among other things have the effect of reproducing the very market-like relations we are 
trying to criticize (cf. Krippner et al 2004). In fact, while we appreciate Marginson’s (2013) argument that 
a “bona fide” capitalist market in higher education is likely impossible, market-like relations and 
competition are clearly present in the higher education sector. The point is that denying the existence of a 
market because it does not conform to neo-classical economic theory assumes a separation of economic 
from social relations, which makes it more difficult to understand how social relations can become 
increasingly or incrementally marketized over time.  
11 
 
Carroll, G. R., & Teece, D. J. (eds.) (1999) Firms, markets, and hierarchies : The transaction cost 
economics perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Christophers, B. (2016) The Great Leveler: Capitalism and Competition in the Court of Law, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press 
 
Christophers, B. (2019) “The allusive market: insurance of flood risk in 
neoliberal Britain”, Economy and Society, available online: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2018.1547494 
 
Clarke, M. (2012) “The (absent) politics of neo-liberal education policy,Critical Studies in 
Education”, 53 (3): 297-310. 
 
Coase, R.H. (1937) “The Nature of the Firm” Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16., pp. 386-
405. 
 
Coase, R.H. (1960) “The Problem of Social Cost” The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3  
 
Collini, S. (2017) Speaking of Universities, Brooklyn: Verso 
 
Couch, D. (2019) “The policy reassembly of Afghanistan's higher education 
System”, Globalisation, Societies and Education, DOI: 10.1080/14767724.2018.1523708 
 
Davies, W. (2014) The Limits of Neoliberalism, London: Sage. 
 
Dean, J., 2008. Enjoying neoliberalism. Cultural Politics, 4(1), pp.47-72. 
 
Komljenovic, J. (2019) “Linkedin, platforming labour, and the new employability mandate for 
universities”, Globalisation, Societies and Education, DOI: 10.1080/14767724.2018.1500275 
 
Komljenovic, J. and Robertson S.L. (2016) “The Dynamics of ‘Market-Making’ in Higher 
Education.” Journal of Education Policy 31 (5): 622–36. 
 
Krippner, G. et al. (2004) “Polanyi Symposium: a conversation on embeddedness” Socio-Economic 
Review, 2: 109-135 
 
Lewis, N. & Shore, C. (2019) “From unbundling to market making: reimagining, reassembling 
and reinventing the public university”, Globalisation, Societies and Education, DOI: 
10.1080/14767724.2018.1524287 
 
Mann, G. (2013) Disassembly Required: A Field Guide to Actually Existing Capitalism, Oakland, CA: 
AK Press 
 
Marginson, S. (2013) “The impossibility of capitalist markets in higher education”, Journal of 
Education Policy, 28:3, 353-370 
 
McCowan, T. 2017. “Higher Education, Unbundling, and the end of the University as We Know 
It.” Oxford Review of Education 43 (6): 733–748. 
 
Mirwoski, P. (2011) Science-Mart: Privatizing American Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 
12 
 
 
Mouffe, C. (2018) For a Left Populism, Brooklyn: Verso 
 
Muellerleile, C. & Robertson, S.L. (2018) “Digital Weberianism: Bureaucracy, Information, and 
the Techno-rationality of Neoliberal Capitalism”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
 
Newfield, C. (2019) “Unbundling the Knowledge Economy”, to be included in this issue of 
Globalisation, Societies and Education 
 
Robertson, S. L., and J. Komljenovic. 2016. “Unbundling and Making Higher Education 
Markets.” In World Yearbook in Education: Global Education Industry, edited by A. Verger, C. 
Lubienski, and G. Steiner-Kamsi, 211–227, London: Routledge. 
 
Walker, R. (1988) “The Geographic Organization of Production Systems” Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space, vol 6 
 
Žižek 1999 The Ticklish Subject. London: Verso 
.  
 
